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THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND DIVIDEND POLICY: 
THE EFFECT OF GENDER DIVERSITY 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we aim to study the impact of gender diversity on Board of Directors (hereinafter 
BD) on dividend policy. We hypothesize that the percentage of women directors, the 
percentage of independent, institutional and executive female directors, and the percentage of 
shares held by women directors on BDs have an impact on the dividend policy of Spanish 
firms. Our results show that the percentage of female directors and shares held by female 
directors are positively associated with dividend payout, while the percentage of institutional 
women directors has a negative impact. The percentage of independent and executive female 
directors has no effect on dividend payout. The results confirm that gender diversity has 
influence on dividend payout, so the existing legislation should encourage more participation 
by women in governing bodies. Our evidence supports the Act for Effective Equality between 
Women and Men, which establishes that listing companies have to achieve a quota of 40% of 
women in decision-making bodies by 2015. However, the progress made is still too slow to 
meet the government’s target, and for this reason we recommend that stronger government 
sanctions, combined with more effective equality plans within companies, are required for the 
quota to be met. 
 






















Agency theory posits that the separation between the ownership and control of the 
organization causes information asymmetries between shareholders and managers, which 
generate agency costs. The payment of dividends is considered one of the most important 
mechanisms to reduce or mitigate agency cost (Byoun et al., 2013; Jensen, 1986; Van Pelt, 
2013). This is consistent with Bhattacharya (1979) and Ross (1977), who showed that firms 
with high information asymmetry paid higher dividends in order to signal their prospects to 
shareholders.  
Prior evidence analyses the influence on dividend payout of ownership concentration (Chen et 
al., 2005; Erol and Tirtiroglu, 2011), outside directors (Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009; Setia-
Atmaja, 2010), taxes on dividends (Amihud and Murgia, 1997), future earnings (Flint et al., 
2010; Lee, 2010; Vermeulen, 2011) and investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000), among 
others. However, academic literature on dividend policy has paid little attention to other 
features, including gender diversity. 
Corporate governance literature shows that gender diversity on corporate boards may 
influence the supervision and control of the board’s activities (see, e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Erhardt et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2009; Huse and Solberg, 2006; Nielsen and Huse, 
2010; Rose, 2007). The effect of gender diversity on corporate boards (within the corporate 
governance system) has become relevant today for shareholders and managers of modern 
firms, mass media, politicians and legislators, among others, because many countries have 
already legislated laws or advanced policies that are aimed at increasing the percentage of 
women directors on boards of directors (hereinafter BD) (e.g. Norway, Spain and France). 
Focusing on Spain, Act 3/2007, “The Equality Law”, was issued in 2007 in order to establish 
a target gender quota of 40% on boards of listed companies to be reached by 2015.  
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Most previous research provides evidence that women on boards have an important influence 
on firm performance (Adler, 2001; Adam and Ferreira, 2003; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
2008; Carter et al., 2003; Catalyst, 2004; Farrel and Hersch, 2005; Shrader et al., 2007; 
Krishnan and Park, 2005), fostering good corporate practice (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; 
Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996) and financial reporting quality (Gulzar and Wang, 2011; Qi 
and Tian, 2012), among others. Thus, given the importance of women on boards in allocating 
capital to corporations, their role in firm governance (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; 
Terjesen et al., 2009), and the scant research performed combining gender diversity on BDs 
and dividend payment (Van Pelt, 2013; Wellalage et al., 2012), an understanding of how 
gender diversity on BDs affects dividend policy is undoubtedly needed. Thus, the aim of this 
study is to contribute to the growing literature on the role of women in corporate governance 
and, more concretely, to analyse whether gender diversity on BDs has an effect on the 
dividend policy of the companies.  
This study contributes to the literature by showing that gender diversity on BDs influences the 
dividend policy of firms, concretely the percentage of women directors, the percentage of 
institutional women directors and the percentage of shares held by women directors. Our 
evidence supports the Spanish Law (Act 3/2007 of 22 March, for Effective Equality between 
Women and Men), which is based on the premise that corporate boards’ female quote should 
be 40%. The Spanish legislator allows listing companies to achieve this gender quota by 
2015, so the current legislation should encourage more participation by women in governing 
bodies. However, the progress made is still too slow to meet the government’s 2015 target, 
and for this reason we recommend that stronger government sanctions, combined with more 
effective equality plans within companies, are required for the quota to be met. Secondly, our 
study provides evidence that gender diversity on BDs can alleviate the agency problem of free 
cash flow by monitoring and resolving the manager–shareholder conflict in an effective way; 
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this is particularly true in the Spanish context, where two important agency problems are 
currently weak, namely shareholder rights and low management ownership. Thirdly, our 
findings suggest that a diverse board yields benefits to shareholders through its effect on 
dividend policy, and further contributes to the literature on the factors that influence dividend 
payout policy. This may be useful for current and potential shareholders of listing firms to 
know more deeply the dividends policies of the companies in which they invest. Finally, 
Spain is a good context in which to examine the effect of gender diversity on BDs on 
dividend policies, since most of the studies about dividend policy refer to non-European 
countries (Bathala and Rao, 1985; Zhou and Ruland, 2006; Rakotomavo, 2010; Gupta and 
Parua, 2012; Said, 2013).  
The structure of this paper is as follows. After this introduction, the second section focuses on 
the theoretical background. The third section describes the institutional background, while in 
the fourth section we review the previous literature and develop the hypotheses. The fifth 
section describes the sample, methodology and variables used in the study; the sixth section 
shows the obtained results. In the final section, we discuss our conclusions; explain the 
limitations inherent to this study and the future lines of research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Gender diversity on corporate boards has received growing attention within corporate 
governance (Carrasco and Laffarga, 2007). Research suggests that women play a significant 
role in enhancing board effectiveness and shows the positive impact of board gender diversity 
on improving the quality of financial information, fostering good corporate practice or 
dividend policy (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996; Wellalage et al., 
2012). Most previous research (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 1982) draws on 
agency theory to analyse the influence of dividend policy when there are conflicts of interest 
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within organizations and also to examine the link between gender diversity on BDs and 
dividend policy (Van Pelt, 2013; Wellalage et al., 2012). Thus, this study focuses on agency 
theory.  
According to agency theory, the separation between the ownership and control of the firm 
generates information asymmetries between the parties, because the owners of a firm have 
delegated to managers to act on their behalf. This informational disadvantage between both 
parties includes information about the firm's prospects, earnings and risk aversion, among 
others. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained that information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders might lead to agency costs. This gives rise to a conflict of interest between 
ownership (principal) and the control of the firm (agent), and therefore becomes an agency 
problem, which makes investors pessimistic about future cash flows being absorbed (Krafft et 
al., 2013). Managers take daily decisions about the firm’s earnings, although they do not 
always adopt dividend policies which benefit the shareholders’ interests. From time to time, 
they may choose a dividend policy that maximizes their own private benefits. Grossman and 
Hart (1980) documented how dividend payout mitigated agency conflicts by reducing the 
amount of free cash flow available to managers. In the same vein, Jensen (1986) showed that 
the distribution of dividends reduces free cash flow at managers’ disposal, prevents 
unprofitable projects and alleviates agency costs. Hwang et al. (2013) demonstrated that 
dividend payments reduced the amount of free cash flow, thus reducing minority shareholder 
rights. 
Given that it has an effect on both of their interests, dividend policy is the most important 
economic and financial policy for managers and investors. Furthermore, it affects the value 
and financial and economic capacity of the firm. Dividend payouts reduce the total amount of 
retained profit and reduce financing with private capital. For this reason, dividend policy 
depends on companies’ profit distribution priorities and investment financing decisions.  
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The payment of dividends, managerial equity ownership and debt financing are considered 
effective mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts of interest within the firm (Bathala and 
Rao, 1995; Díez et al., 2001). Rozeff (1982) analysed 1000 firms on the Value Line 
Investment Survey, and evidenced that dividend payments could be part of a corporate 
monitoring tool. In a similar manner, Easterbrook (1984) argued that dividends help alleviate 
agency conflicts by exposing firms to more frequent monitoring by primary capital markets, 
as paying dividends increased the probability that new common stock had to be issued. De 
Angelo et al. (2004) showed that firms with high cash and low debt capital structures paid 
dividends to mitigate agency costs. Sedzro (2010) examined repurchases and regular and 
special dividends, and concluded that firms with agency problems increased their regular 
dividends. However, Chay and Suh (2009) analysed 5000 firms from Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US, and found weak association between payout 
policy and agency conflicts.  
Agency theory also suggests that women on corporate boards might make stronger existing 
control mechanisms over managers and executives since female directors on BDs increase 
board independence and are inclined to ask many questions (Carter et al., 2010). Gender 
heterogeneity among board members improves mutual monitoring and it serves as a 
“watchdog for shareholder” (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Thus, women directors on BDs have 
the potential to help align the incentives of shareholders and managers though their impact on 
the pay-out policy, since they may have high cash flows, and to reduce free cash flow 
problems they may pay high dividends to their shareholders. Moreover, boards with a high 
proportion of female directors may reduce impediments for dividend pay-out. These views are 
supported by authors such as Knyazeva et al. (2009), who demonstrated that heterogeneous 
boards were associated with lower cash holdings and higher dividends, and Wellalage et al. 
(2012), who documented that the presence of female directors on BDs and CEO duality could 
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pay higher dividends to shareholders. In the same line, Byoun et al. (2013) documented that 
gender diversity on BDs increased the payment of dividends when firms have greater agency 
problems regarding free cash flow, suggesting that females on BDs helped mitigate the free 
cash flow problem and Van Pelt (2013) reported that the percentage of women on BDs 
increased payout dividends.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
The context in which this study is framed is crucial, and for this reason a brief overview of 
some important issues concerning Spanish dividend policy is provided. In this sense, we deal 
with the financial situation, corporate governance system and gender diversity. 
The recent worldwide financial crisis has led to the international financial system losing its 
credibility. In addition, firms have problems in getting funding because banks do not provide 
financing to them. Many Spanish firms have difficulty in getting financing. Firstly, Spanish 
banks have cut their financing to clients and firms. On the other hand, firms cannot use 
internal financing because they cannot attend to their debts. Companies are going bankrupt 
because they cannot pay their debt, consequently leading to increasing unemployment. 
The Spanish corporate governance system is characterized by the presence of few large 
shareholders or independence on their boards, under-developed capital markets, no active 
market control, high ownership concentration and a one-tier board system (all directors, 
executives and non-executives form one board). In this sense, De Miguel et al. (2004) showed 
that ownership concentration is higher in Spain than in countries such as the US, the UK, 
Japan and Germany. In these countries, important institutions, such as the government and 
large banks, have become controlling shareholders. As in other continental European 
corporate governance systems (Faccio and Lang, 2002), most of these institutions attain an 
important position on boards as they represent the interests of large shareholders and 
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institutional investors (Kirchmaier and Grant, 2005). Most of these institutional investors are 
banks, investment funds and insurance companies. Institutional investors directly influence 
the management’s activities through their ownership, and indirectly by trading their shares 
(see Montalban and Sakinç, 2013). In this vein, Delgado-García et al. (2010) documented that 
ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder erodes the corporate 
reputation of Spanish firms. Continental European countries’ financial systems contrast with 
Anglo-American ones because the latter do not consider institutional investors as significant 
members of the board.  
Spain has undergone significant legal and institutional changes in order to increase the 
transparency of the stock markets and to protect minority shareholders. One of the 
consequences has been the issue of several codes of Corporate Governance: Olivencia in 
1998, Aldama in 2003, and finally, the Conthe Code in 2006 which are characterized by a 
“comply or explain” principle in the enforcement of corporate governance regulations.  
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the continuous political and socio-economic changes 
in Spain in recent years have increased gender diversity on boards of directors. This increase 
was enhanced by the CUBG (2006), whose recommendations are intended to support female 
presence on decision-making bodies, including ACs, and by the implementation of Act 
3/2007 of 22 March, in 2007, for Effective Equality between Women and Men (LOIMH, 
2007), which frames the regulation of the appointment of men and women on boards of 
directors in an equitable way. In fact, the LOIMH (2007) forces Spanish boards of listed 
companies to reach a gender quota of 40% by 2015 (a detailed analysis of gender quotas for 
BDs in several countries can be found in Terjesen et al., 2014). According to González-
Menéndez and Martínez-González (2012), after the recommendations of the CUBG (2006) 
and the debate of the Draft Equality Law (later Act 3/2007 of 22 March, LOIMH), most of the 
improvements in women’s representation on boards occurred between 2005 and 2006. 
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However, the study of Gómez (2005) documented that the presence of women on Spanish 
boards of directors was lower than in other European Union countries.  
Gender issues in Spain came to the political and business arena later than in other countries 
mainly for historical reasons. Spain, from 1936 to 1975, was governed by the dictator General 
Franco, who ruled in a conservative way. In this context, he prohibited women to work, own 
property or open a bank account, among others. The end of the dictatorship contributed to the 
fact that women entered the workforce in significant numbers. Consequently across the world, 
including Spain, between the 1980s and the 1990s women’s participation in labour markets 
grew considerably; however, female participation is lower than that of men in most European 
countries, especially in Spain, where the percentage of women in the Spanish workforce is 
lower than in other OECD countries (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). The relevant drive 
to promote the presence of women in the Spanish workforce, and particularly in boardrooms, 
came from the socialist Prime Minister José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, who made gender 
equality one of his government’s top priorities and approved the Conthe Code or CUBG 
(2006) and the LOIMH (2007). In light of this, González-Menéndez and Martínez-González 
(2012) analysed the Spanish Labour Force Survey and reported that the presence of women 
directors on the listed firms’ corporate boards rose from 5.6% in 2004 to 10.40% in 2010 (an 
in-depth discussion about the historical background to the role of women in Spain and its 










Percentage of female directors on Boards of Directors 
Gender diversity on BDs can help to mitigate agency problems by monitoring and resolving 
conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders (Jurkus et al., 2011). Authors such 
as Page (2008), Anderson et al. (2011) and Byoun et al. (2013), among others, argue that 
gender diversity on BDs could decrease the conflicts between the principal and the agent.  
Previous evidence focuses on the analysis between women on BDs and dividend payout. In 
this sense, Knyazeva et al. (2009) examined the Compustat database, CDA Spectrum and 
Corporate Library’s Board Analyst data for the period 2001–2006, and found that board 
heterogeneity is associated with higher dividends. Wellalage et al. (2012) observed the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2001 to 2005, and documented how the presence of 
female directors could mean higher dividends paid to shareholders. Byoun et al. (2013) 
consider 2,234 firms of Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database, and 
showed that firms with more gender diverse BDs are more likely to pay larger dividends than 
firms without diversity on their BD when firms perform large free cash flows and cause 
agency problems. In particular, firms with gender diversity on their BD are associated with a 
roughly 15% higher probability of paying dividends than firms without gender diversity. Van 
Pelt (2013) analysed a total number of 1,350 firm-year observations, and considered that 
gender diversity on BDs increased payout dividends. Nevertheless, Lückerath-Rovers (2013) 
examined 116 Dutch companies listed on the Amsterdam Euronext Stock Exchange, and 
found that firms with female directors paid lower dividends than companies without female 
directors. Similar evidence was provided by Jurkus et al. (2011). 
In sum, the previous literature seems to support the hypothesis that women's presence on BDs 
has positive impacts on dividend payout. Therefore, we predict that the percentage of female 
on BDs may have a positive effect on dividend payout. Ye et al. (2010) provide evidence that 
12 
 
companies with a higher proportion of women directors perform better than those without 
gender diversity, and this could increase the dividend payout. Hence, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The percentage of female directors on the Board of Directors is 
positively associated with the dividend policy 
 
Percentage of female independent directors on Boards of Directors 
The presence of independent members on BDs is essential to perform the functions of 
monitoring and supervision. Independent directors can constrain the management's 
opportunistic dividend policies, which often benefit them and other stakeholders at the 
expense of shareholders. In recent years, the proportion of independent directors on BDs has 
increased because of the need to protect shareholders from managerial abuse and to maximize 
firm value (Linck et al., 2009). Independent directors have strong incentives to issue 
independent and free judgment relating to management influence (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Weisbach, 1988; Linck et al., 2009). 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between the presence of independent 
directors on BDs and dividend payout. In this sense, Belden et al. (2005) examined 524 
companies listed in the Forbes 500 list of the largest American companies, and showed that 
firms with more outside directors paid higher dividends. Setia-Atmaja (2010) concluded that 
the presence of independent members on the BDs listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
increased the dividend payout ratio. Sharma (2011) examined 944 firms of S&P 1500, and 
evidenced that greater independent director representation on the BD has a positive and 
significant influence on the propensity to pay dividends. In the same vein, Al Shabibi and 
Ramesh (2011) studied the Forecasting Analysis and Modelling Environment (FAME) 
database in 2007, and reported that the increment of independent directors on the BD 
13 
 
positively influenced the dividends paid to shareholders. Furthermore, Wellalage et al. (2012) 
documented a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the 
payment of high dividends; while Byoun et al. (2013) reported that the existence of more 
independent board members tends to pay higher dividends. O'Connor (2013) analysed 220 
companies from 21 countries, and demonstrated that dividend payout increased in firms 
where board independence was higher. Contrary to this evidence, other studies (e.g. Bathala 
and Rao, 1995; Borokhovich, et al., 2005; Ruiz et al., 2008; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009; 
Tseng et al., 2012) showed that there was a negative relationship between independent 
directors and dividend payout. 
Previous evidence does not directly address the relationship between independent women on 
BDs and dividend policy. Notwithstanding, we predict a positive association between the 
proportion of independent female directors and dividend payout, as this will allow them to 
possess more comprehensive control over members of the board (Erhardt et al., 2003), which 
could also reduce conflicts of interests between directors and shareholders (Jurkus et al., 
2011).  
Hence, we posit our second hypothesis in the following manner: 
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of female independent directors on the Board of 
Directors is positively associated with the dividend policy 
 
Percentage of female institutional directors on Boards of Directors 
Institutional directors are those who hold a percentage of shares greater than or equal to what 
is considered legally significant, or who have been appointed in their capacity as shareholders  
despite their shareholding not reaching that amount and who thus represent the 
aforementioned shareholders (CUBG, 2006). For this reason, institutional investors have been 
the most important controlling shareholders in cases where the principal agency conflict has 
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been based on the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, institutional owners can monitor the company and influence the amount of 
dividends paid. In this sense, Chen et al. (2005) suggested that dividend payout has been used 
by controlling shareholders in smaller Hong Kong companies as a way of extracting resources 
from the firms they control.  
Previous works have examined the relationship between institutional investors and dividend 
payout. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) analysed the monitoring role of pension funds in 289 firms 
in 1996, and found that firms with high levels of pension fund ownership were less likely to 
be efficient or to pay higher dividends than their industry counterparts. Gugler (2003) 
investigated Austrian firms over the 1991–1999 period, and documented that state-controlled 
firms exhibit a higher dividend payout than family-controlled firms. Khan (2006) examined 
the UK Stock Exchange, and showed a positive relationship between the level of insurance 
company shareholding and dividends payout, while a negative relationship was found for 
shareholding by individual investors. Al-Kuwari (2012) observed 37 non-financial firms 
listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange in an emerging market between 1999 and 2003, and 
found that the government ownership increased the probability of paying dividends, 
consequently resulting in reduced agency problems. Similar evidence was reported by He et 
al. (2012). 
A large number of previous studies provide evidence that institutional ownership contributes 
to increased dividend payout (e.g. Han et al., 1999; Short et al., 2002; Farinha, 2003; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Hovakimian and Li, 2010; Van Pelt, 2013). Nevertheless, Kania and 
Bacon (2005), Amidu and Abor (2006), Azzam (2010) and Ferreira et al. (2010), among 
others, found that institutional ownership was negatively associated with dividend payout  
These studies do not directly examine the relationship between female institutional directors 
and dividend payout. In addition, previous evidence regarding the relationship between 
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institutional directors and dividend payout is inconclusive. For this reason, we predict that the 
percentage of female institutional directors can either positively or negatively affect the 
dividend payout.  
Hence, we pose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage of female institutional directors on the Board of 
Directors is positively and negatively associated with the dividend policy 
 
Percentage of female Executive Directors on Boards of Directors 
The presence of executive directors on BDs reduces firm performance due to agency costs 
arising between internal directors and minority shareholders (Cho and Kim, 2007). Dividend 
payout has been used by companies to reduce agency problems between owners and 
managers (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000). 
According to Jensen (1986), CEO duality on BDs increased the concentration of power in one 
person, leading to opportunistic behaviour that was contrary to the interests of shareholders. 
Maury and Pajuste (2002) examined the Helsinki Stock Exchange from 1999 to 2000, and 
showed firms paid lower dividends when the CEO was a large shareholder. Zhang (2008) 
compared the cash dividend policy of Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and those on the 
Mainland, and showed that Mainland-listed firms with combined CEO and chairman titles on 
their BD tended to pay lower cash dividends; however, there was no such evidence about 
Hong Kong-listed firms. Francis et al. (2009) studied the ExecuComp database, and 
documented that female CFOs reduced dividend payouts. Deshmukh et al. (2010) used panel 
data from large US companies over the period 1980–1994, and documented that firms 
managed by overconfident CEOs had lower levels of dividend payout. In this sense, Banerjee 
et al. (2013) studied 3,492 observations from the Compustat database, and evidenced that 
overconfident CEOs tended to prefer not to pay dividends, preferring instead to substitute 
16 
 
dividends for stock. Wellalage et al. (2012) analysed the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and 
showed that CEO duality on boards resulted in higher dividends. Meanwhile, Van Pelt (2013) 
found a negative association between the percentage of inside directors on BDs and dividend 
payout. However, Mansourinia et al. (2013) examined a sample of companies listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2006–2010, and found that there was not a 
significant relationship between CEO duality and dividend policy. 
Other studies concluded that CEO duality was positively associated with dividend payout 
(Cheung et al., 2005; John and Knyazeva, 2006; Feng et al., 2007; Obradovich and Gill, 
2012; Wellalage et al., 2012). Abor and Fiador (2013) observed a sample of listed firms on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
and the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1997–2006, and showed that Nigerian firms 
which separated the roles of CEO and chairman on the corporate board had higher dividend 
payouts.  
Previous literature focuses on the impact that executive directors on BDs have on dividend 
payout; however, the effect that female executives on BDs have on dividend policy has not 
been previously analysed. Despite this, we predict that the presence of female executive 
directors on BDs is negatively associated with dividend payout, since a lower payout of 
dividends will allow firms to reduce agency costs.  
Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of female executive directors on the Board of Directors 
is negatively associated with the dividend policy 
 
Percentage of shares held by female directors on Boards of Directors 
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Agency theory argues that when shareholders have greater rights (voting power), they can use 
this power to influence dividend policy. A strong legal system helps to protect minority 
shareholders from majority shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour, such as wealth 
expropriation and excessive compensation. La Porta et al. (2000) and Wellalage et al. (2012) 
evidenced that countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders paid lower 
dividends.  
Most of previous studies analyse the relationship between shareholders’ rights – by means of 
voting – and dividend payout. Nielsen (2005) studied the Compustat Industrial Annual 
Database from 1987–2003, and demonstrated that companies with weaker shareholders were 
more likely to pay dividends. Jiraporn and Ning (2006) examined 3,732 firm-year 
observations, and evidenced that firms where shareholder rights were weak paid out higher 
dividends. However, Kowalewski et al. (2007) observed 110 non-financial listed companies 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, and showed that companies with strong shareholder rights 
paid more dividends than firms with low corporate governance standards. Adjaoud and Ben-
Amar (2010) observed 714 firm-year observations, and evidenced that when shareholder 
rights were strong, the dividend payout increased, as shareholders could use their powers to 
pressure managers to pay higher dividends. Hwang et al. (2013) studied a sample of Korean 
companies during the period 2003–2010, and evidenced that firms with weaker shareholder 
rights paid lower dividends. 
Other studies (Pérez-González, 2003; Troung and Heaney, 2007; Ramli, 2011) evidenced that 
the largest shareholder often increased dividend payout. Nevertheless, authors such as Maury 
and Pajuste (2002), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006), among 
others, found that the largest shareholders reduced dividend payout levels. Moreover, 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) studied 287 firms in the Value Line Investment Survey, and 
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concluded that there was no significant difference among dividend payouts with or without 
large shareholders. 
Previous evidence about the impact of shares held by directors (shareholders vote rights) on 
dividend policy does not deal with the relationship between shares held by female directors 
and dividend policy. Regardless, we predict that the shares held by female directors on BDs 
may have a positive effect on dividend payout, since shareholders could use their power by 
means of their voting rights to pressure managers to pay higher dividends (Adjaoud and Ben-
Amar, 2010), and therefore female directors could increase their personal benefits. 
Hence, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of shares held by female directors on the Board of 




The sample is drawn from the population of Spanish non-financial firms listed on the Spanish 
Stock Exchange during 2004–2012. We exclude financial companies both because they are 
under special scrutiny by financial authorities that constrain the role of their board of 
directors, and due to their special accounting practices. Spanish data is obtained from the 
“Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” (SABI) database, from the annual corporate 
governance reports that all listed companies have been required to publish since 2003 and 
from the companies’ Web pages.  
We build an unbalanced panel of 910 firm-year observations from 174 firms. Our sample 
roughly accounts for more than 95% of the capitalization of Spanish non-financial firms. The 
panel is unbalanced because some firms became public during this time period, while other 
firms delisted as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions. Nevertheless, the estimations 
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The dependent variable (DPY) is calculated in three ways: (1) as a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise (Al-Malkawi, 2008; Al-Najjar 
and Hussainey, 2009; Byoun et al., 2013); (2) as cash dividends on common stock divided by 
the market value of common stock of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange (Fenn and 
Liang, 2001); (3) as the logarithm of the total amount of dividend paid per share in the 
accounting year (Kumar, 2006). 
As independent variables, we define the percentage of female directors on the BD as 
PERWDBD; it is calculated as the ratio between the total number of women on the BD and 
the total members of the BD. The PERIWDBD variable represents the percentage of 
independent women directors on the BD; this is calculated as the ratio between the total 
number of independent female directors on the BD and the total number of directors on the 
BD. The PERINSWDBD defines the percentage of institutional female directors; it is 
calculated as the ratio between the total number of institutional women directors on the BD 
and the total number of directors on the BD. The percentage of executive female directors on 
the BD is defined as PEREWDBD; it is calculated as the ratio between the total executive 
women directors on the BD and the total number of directors on the BD. Finally, the variable 
OWNWOMBD represents the percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD; it is 
calculated as the proportion of shares held by women directors.  
We control for a number of factors supported by previous evidence (see Rozeff, 1982) that 
can potentially affect dividend payout. OWNCON measures ownership concentration and is 
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calculated as the percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 10% of the firm’s 
stock (Sedzro, 2010). Rozeff (1982), Jensen et al. (1992), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and 
Kumar (2006), among others, showed a negative relationship between the ownership 
concentration and dividend payout. Another control variable used is investment opportunities; 
in line with Ruiz et al. (2008), and we define it as IO, which is calculated as the rate of assets 
growth. Authors such as Rozeff (1982), Díez et al. (2001), Fama and French (2001), Mitton 
(2004), Denis and Osobov (2008), Ruiz et al. (2008), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009), Setia-
Atmaja (2010), Sharma (2011) and O’Connor (2013) demonstrated a negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and dividend payout. The ownership of managers is also 
considered as control variable; it is defined as OWNMANG and calculated as the percentage 
of stocks owned by directors. Previous studies (Rozeff, 1982; Fama and French, 2001; Short 
et al., 2002; Hu and Kumar, 2004; Azzam, 2010) reported a negative relationship between the 
percentage of shares held by managers and dividend policy.  
LEV is calculated as the ratio of book value of debt over total assets, and represents the 
leverage level of the firm. Previous literature (e.g. Díez et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2001; 
Fenn and Liang, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Ruiz et al., 2008; Setia-Atmaja, 2010; Jirapon 
et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011, Byoun et al., 2013) has shown that high financial leverage was 
negatively related to dividend payout. We also control for profitability, which is defined as 
ROA, and calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) over book 
assets (O’Connor, 2013). Díez et al. (2001), Fama and French (2001), Kania and Bacon 
(2005), Amidu and Abor (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008), Abdelsalam et al. (2008), Al-
Najjar and Hussainey (2009), Jirapon et al. (2011), Al Shabibi and Ramesh (2011) and 
O’Connor (2013) demonstrated that firms with a high return on assets ratio had a greater 
potential to pay dividends. ROE represents the profitability of stockholders' investments and, 
in line with Diez et al. (2001), is calculated as the net income divided by stockholders’ equity. 
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Previous evidence documented that there was a negative relationship between returns on 
equity and the dividend payout (e.g. Diez et al., 2001; Azofra and López-de-Fornoda, 2007; 
Ali Shah et al., 2011; Metha, 2012).  
Previous literature shows a positive association between firm size and the dividend payout 
(e.g. Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Ruiz et al., 
2008; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; Setia-Atmaja, 2010; Al 
Shabibi and Ramesh, 2011; Jirapon et al., 2011; Byoun et al., 2013; O’Connor, 2013). Thus, 
we define firm size as FIRMSIZE; it is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets of 
the firm. Finally, various studies (e.g. Obradovich and Gill, 2012; Mansourinia et al., 2013) 
reported that board size had a positive impact on pay dividends. We therefore define board 
size as BDSIZE and calculate it as the total number of directors serving on the board 
(Obradovich and Gill, 2012).  
The variables used in the model and the expected signs of each are shown in table 1.  




Table 2 presents the mean value, the standard error and the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of 
all the variables. As can be seen, 56% of the Spanish firms decide to pay dividends. In 
addition, the average ratio between cash dividends on common stock and the market value of 
common stock of firms is 38’579, with firms paying 5’777€ on average (logarithm of total 
amount of dividends paid per share in the accounting year). Furthermore, the statistics reveal 
that 7’8% of BD’s members are women, being 2’9% female independent directors, 3’8% 
female institutional directors and 0’8% are female executive directors.  
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The ownership of the firms held by women on BDs is 2’40%, the ownership concentration of 
the companies is 54’20%, the investment opportunities are 20’90% and the management 
ownership is 26’81%. Also, it can be seen that the level of leverage is 60’20%; the return on 
assets is, on average, -2’20%, while the return on equity is -9’20%. Finally, the firm size is 
13’30 (log of the total assets), while the board size, on average, is 10’78 members. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 presents the mean differences of the independent variables of Model 1, where the 
dependent variable DPY1 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company pays 
dividends, and 0 otherwise. Two groups have been made up in order to analyse mean 
differences among independent variables in relation to whether the company pays dividends 
or not. The results in Table 3 show that the mean difference of the variable percentage of 
independent female directors on BDs is positive and statistically significant at a level of 1%. 
Therefore, we can accept the second hypothesis. Thus, these findings show that there is a 
positive association between the percentage of independent women directors and the dividend 
payout. Concerning the remainder of independent variables, each present the expected sign, 
but none are statistically significant. Thus, the first, third, fourth and fifth hypotheses cannot 
be accepted.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
In Table 4 we provide the mean differences for the independent variables of Model 2, where 
the dependent variable DPY2 represents the dividend payment in relation to the capitalization. 
Two groups have been created according to the median of the dependent variables (which is 
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7’14). This analysis reveals that, as in Model 1, the percentage of independent women 
directors on BDs is positive and statistically significant at a 1% level. Hence, we can accept 
the second hypothesis. Therefore, the percentage of independent female directors is positively 
associated with the ratio between cash dividends paid per share and firm capitalization. The 
remainder of independent variables offers the predicted sign, but they are not statistically 
significant.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 5 shows the mean difference for the independent variables of Model 3, where the 
dependent variable DPY3 represents the dividend payment per share in the accounting year.  
The median of the dependent variable to create the two groups is 7’65. The analysis of the 
results reveals that the percentage of independent women directors and the percentage of 
institutional female directors on BDs present the expected sign and are statistically significant 
at a level of 1% and 5%, respectively. Hence, we can accept the second and third hypotheses. 
Thus, according to these results, we can conclude that a higher percentage of independent 
female directors on BDs makes them more likely to pay dividends, while the percentage of 
institutional female directors on BDs means they are less likely to pay dividends. The rest of 
independent variables are not statistically significant. 








In Table 6 we present the results for the Spearman correlation matrix in order to test for 
multicollinearity. The correlation between most of the pairs is not significant and is low 
(generally below 0’5). Further, none of the correlation coefficients are high enough (>0.80) to 
cause multicollinearity problems (see Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001). According to these 
results, we can conclude that these models do not have significant multicollinearity problems. 
In any case, we also calculate the vector inflation factor (VIF) to corroborate that our results 
are not biased because of the multicollinearity. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
In Table 7 we show the results of the regression for women directors on BDs. As can be 
observed, we have built three models. In Model 1 we examined whether firms pay or do not 
pay dividends; in Model 2 we examine the dividend payment in relation to capitalization; 
while in Model 3 we analyse the of the total amount of dividend payout per share in the 
accounting year. The statistic tests show that the three models are statistically significant at 
1%. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
According to our predictions – and as can be appreciated in Model 1, where the dependent 
variable takes the value 1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise – the percentage of 
female directors on BDs (PERWDBD) presents the expected sign and is statistically 
significant at 1%. Thus, we can accept the first hypothesis: the percentage of women directors 
on BDs increases the probability of dividend payout. Authors such as Knyazeva et al. (2009), 
Byoun et al. (2013) and Van Pelt (2013) also provide evidence of the positive relationship 
between the percentage of women on BDs and dividend payout. As predicted, the variable 
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percentage of institutional female directors on BDs (PERINSWDBD) offers a negative sign 
and is statistically significant at 5%. Thus, the third hypothesis can also be accepted. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the percentage of institutional women directors on BDs 
negatively influence decisions regarding paying dividends. Similar evidence was reported by 
Kania and Bacon (2005), Amidu and Abor (2006), Azzam (2010) and Ferreira et al. (2010), 
among others. The remainder of independent variables, the percentage of independent female 
directors (PERIWDBD), the percentage of executive women directors (PEREWDBD) and the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on BDs (OWNWOMBD) offers the expected 
sign, but they are not statistically significant. Hence, we cannot accept the second, fourth and 
fifth hypotheses, and therefore we cannot provide evidence that the percentage of independent 
and executive women directors and the percentage of shares held by female directors on BDs 
have an impact on dividend payout. In this sense, Cotter and Sylvester (2003), Chen et al. 
(2005), Abdelsalam et al. (2008) and Mansourinia et al. (2013), among others, documented 
that no significant association was found between independent directors and dividend payout. 
Concerning the non-relationship between executive directors and the decision of paying 
dividends, Abor and Fiador (2013) and Mansourinia et al. (2013) provide similar findings, 
while Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) and Al-Kuwari (2012) also evidenced that large 
shareholders did not affect dividend payout decisions, which is in line with our findings.  
Regarding the control variables, it can be observed that the variables investment opportunities 
(IO), leverage (LEV), firm size (FIRMSIZE) and board size (BDSIZE) present the expected 
sign and are statistically significant. In addition, the return on equity (ROE) offers a positive 
sign – contrary to that expected – and is statistically significant. In the same vein, Aivazan et 
al. (2003), Abdelsalam et al. (2008) and Malik et al. (2013) documented that there was a 
positive relationship between returns on equity and dividend payout. Thus, these findings 
report that high investment opportunities and levels of leverage are negatively associated with 
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decisions relating to paying dividends, whereas a company is more likely to pay dividends 
when returns on equity (ROE), firm size and board size increase. The rest of control variables 
provide the expected sign, but they are not statistically significant.  
In Model 2, where the dependent variable is the ratio between cash dividends on common 
stock and the market value of firms’ common stock, the independent variables for the 
percentage of female directors (PERWDBD) and the percentage of shares held by female 
directors on BDs (OWNWOMBD) present a positive sign and are statistically significant at 
1% and 5%, respectively. Thus, the first and fifth hypotheses can be accepted, and we can 
conclude that the percentage of women directors and the percentage of shares held by women 
on BDs increase the ratio between cash dividends and capitalization. On the other hand, the 
variable percentage of institutional directors on BDs (PERINSWDBD) presents a negative 
sign and is statistically significant as expected. As a result, we can accept the third hypothesis. 
Therefore, this result implies that as the percentage of institutional female directors increases, 
it is more likely that the ratio between cash dividends and capitalization will decrease.  
In addition, the percentage of independent female directors on BDs (PERIWDBD) and the 
percentage of female executive directors (PEREWDBD) provide the predicted sign; however, 
they are not statistically significant. Hence, we cannot accept the second and fourth 
hypotheses. As a result, we conclude that, as reported in Model 1, the percentage of female 
independent and executive directors on BDs has no impact on the ratio of dividend policy.  
Contrary to our predictions with respect to the control variables, the ownership concentration 
(OWNCON) shows a positive sign and is statistically significant at a level of 1%. In the same 
vein, Ahmed et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2009) documented that listed companies in 
Pakistan and China paid more dividends, respectively, as ownership became more 
concentrated. In addition, the board size (BDSIZE) presents the expected sign and is 
significant at 1%. According to these findings, we can conclude that companies whose 
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ownership is concentrated and whose BDs are large are more likely to pay dividends. The rest 
of the control variables are not statistically significant. 
In Model 3, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the total amount of dividends 
paid per share in the accounting year, the results reveal that the percentage of female directors 
(PERWDBD) and the percentage of shares held by female directors on BDs (OWNWOMBD) 
present the expected sign and are statistically significant at 5% and 10%, respectively. Thus, 
we can accept the first and fifth hypothesis, and can therefore reach the conclusion that the 
dividend payment will increase when the percentage of women directors and the percentage 
of shares held by women directors on BDs also increases. As predicted, the variable 
percentage of institutional female directors on BDs (PERINSWDBD) offers a negative sign 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level, which allows us to accept the third hypothesis. 
Thus, these findings show that the percentage of female institutional directors on BDs will 
reduce the probability of paying dividends. In same vein, Kania and Bacon (2005) and Amidu 
and Abor (2006) found that institutional ownership was negatively associated with dividend 
payout. Moreover, as can be seen in Models 1 and 2, the other independent variables 
(PERIWDBD and PEREWDBD) present the expected sign, but they are not statistically 
significant.  
With regards to the control variables, we can observe that investment opportunities (IO), 
manager ownership (OWNMANG), return on assets (ROA), firm size (FIRMSIZE) and board 
size (BDSIZE) present the expected signs and are statistically significant. Therefore, these 
results provide evidence that investment opportunities and management ownership are 
negatively associated with dividend payout, while those relating to a high return on assets, 
firm size and board size will increase the likelihood of paying dividends. Contrary to our 
expectations, the variables leverage (LEV) and return on equity (ROE) present a positive sign  
and are statistically significant at 1% and 10%, respectively. In line with these findings, 
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Chang and Rhee (1990), Maury and Pajuste (2002), Kania and Bacon (2005) and Kahn (2006) 
reported that there was a positive relationship between leverage and dividend payout. In 
relation to the positive relationship between return on equity (ROE) and the payment of 
dividends, Al -Kuwari (2012) and Ehsan et al. (2013) showed similar conclusions. Thus, we 
can conclude that there is a greater likelihood to pay dividends when the leverage and ROE 




Previous studies have examined the effect of gender diversity on BDs on dividend policy. 
Thus, this study provides insight into the relationship between gender diversity on BDs and 
dividend policies of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. Dividend policy is measured 
in three ways. In Model 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value 
1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise; in Model 2, the dependent variable is the 
ratio between cash dividends on common stock and the market value of common stock of 
firms; and in Model 3, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the total amount of dividend 
payout per share in the accounting year. We hypothesized that the percentage of female 
directors on BDs, the percentage of independent, institutional and executive directors on BDs, 
and the shares held by female directors on BDs would affect dividend policy. 
Our results demonstrate that the percentage of female directors on BDs positively influences 
dividend policy, as the percentage of women directors increases the probability of affecting 
the decision of paying dividends, the ratio between cash dividends and capitalization, and the 
payment of dividends per share in the accounting year. This finding is supported by Ye et al. 
(2010), who showed that the percentage of women directors on BDs increases dividend 
payout. The percentage of independent female directors on BDs has no impact on the 
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dividend policy analysed in the three models. The percentage of institutional female directors 
on BDs negatively impacts on dividend policy, since there is a negative association between 
institutional female directors and the decision of paying dividends, as well as the ratio 
between cash dividends and capitalization and the payment of dividends per share in the 
accounting year. This result suggests that institutional female directors on BDs prefer to pay 
lower dividends, thereby retaining and investing more of their earnings, resulting in agency 
costs being lower. These results support the relevant role of institutional directors on boards 
and the lack of influence of independent directors in European countries, as suggested in the 
literature (e.g. Vafeas, 2000; García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007; Lorca et al., 2011; 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). The lack of significance of independent female 
directors on BDs may be related to the measure of independence, particularly in 
communitarian studies, where there are many concerns that board members are not 
independent of those who nominate them. Other explanations could be the substitution effect 
between independent female and institutional female directors, or as Abdelasam et al. (2008) 
and Mansourinia et al. (2013) reported, because the presence of independent female directors 
on BDs cannot influence the dividend policy decisions of executive directors and managers. 
The percentage of executive female directors on boards has no effect on the dividend payout. 
This result suggests that executive women directors have more firm-specific information, and 
that rather than paying dividends, prefer instead to have higher control of cash to invest in 
their firm’s projects, leading to higher returns. This argument is supported by Jensen (1986) 
and Crifo and Forget (2013), who argue that managers in firms with excess cash flows have 
an incentive to waste organizational resources on personal ends, rather than pay out the excess 
cash to shareholders through dividends. The percentage of shares held by female directors on 
BDs has no effect on the decision of paying dividends or not, but it raises the ratio between 
cash dividends and capitalization and the amount of dividends paid by share in the accounting 
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year. The results suggest that shareholders whose rights are stronger can use their power to 
pressure managers to pay higher dividends (La Porta, et al., 2000; Brockman and Unlu, 2009; 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010).  
The limitations of this study are as follows. Firstly, it is possible that there are unknown 
factors that could impact our dependent variables. While we have controlled for as many 
factors as possible based on theory and prior research, empirical and theoretical limitations 
prevent us from knowing whether all of the important influences have been controlled for and 
addressed. Finally, the study is based on the Madrid Stock Exchange for the period 2004–
2012, so the results obtained should not to be extrapolated to other countries or periods.  
This study could give rise to future lines of research. Firstly, it would add value to analyse the 
impact of gender diversity on BDs on the shares repurchased. Secondly, it would be 
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PERWDBD Total number of women in BD/Total members of BD  + 
PERIWDBD Total number of independent women in BD/Total number of members of BD + 
PERINSWDBD Total number of institutional women in BD/Total number of members of BD +/- 
PEREWDBD Total number of insider women in BD/Total number of members of BD - 
OWNWOMBD Percentage of shares held by women directors on BD  + 




IO  Rate of assets growth     - 
OWNMANG Percentage of stocks owned by directors - 
LEV Ratio of book value of debt over total assets   - 
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT)/Total book assets + 
ROE  Ratio of net income/stockholder's equity   - 
FIRMSIZE Total assets (log)     + 






Main Descriptive Statistics 
a) Continuos Variables 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Perc. 25 Perc. 50 Perc. 75 
DPY2 910 38,579 221,611 0,000 7,139 26,328 
DPY3 910 5,777 5,408 0,000 7,653 10,831 
PERWDBD 910 7,800 0,093 0,000 0,059 0,125 
PERIWDBD 910 2,900 0,057 0,000 0,000 0,000 
PERINSWDBD 910 3,800 0,071 0,000 0,000 0,071 
PEREWDBD 910 0,800 0,033 0,000 0,000 0,000 
OWNWOMBD 910 2,400 9,339 0,000 0,000 0,007 
OWNCON 910 54,20 40,751 20,689 51,104 79,063 
IO  910 20,90 1,293 -0,040 0,034 0,155 
OWNMANG 910 26,80 26,664 1,384 18,535 49,932 
LEV 910 60,20 1,209 0,349 0,562 0,713 
ROA 910 -2,200 2,112 -0,009 0,032 0,084 
ROE  910 -9,200 2,454 -0,001 0,084 0,185 
FIRMSIZE 910 13,295 1,839 11,953 13,162 14,497 
BDSIZE 910 10,778 3,755 8,000 10,000 13,000 
b) Dummies Variables 
   0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
DPY1   397 44% 513 56% 
 
Mean, standard deviation and percentiles of the main variables. DPY2 is cash dividends on common stock 
divided by the market value of common stock of firms; DPY3 is the logarithm of the total amount of dividends 
paid per share in the accounting year; PERWDBD is the percentage of female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD 
is the percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the percentage of institutional 
directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the percentage of 
shares held by female directors on the BD; OWNCON is the percentage of shares held by shareholders holding 
at least 10% of the firm’s stock; IO is the rate of assets growth; OWNMANG is the percentage of stocks owned 
by directors; LEV is the ratio of book value of debt over total book assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxation (EBIT) over total book assets; ROE is the net income divided by stockholder’s equity; 
FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; BDSIZE is calculated as the total number of directors on the 































PERWDBD 0,078 0,077 0,001 
0,246 
(0,806) 
PERIWDBD 0,034 0,022 0,012 
3,119*** 
(0,002) 
PERINSWDBD 0,037 0,040 -0,003 
-0,682 
(0,495) 
PEREWDBD 0,006 0,009 -0,003 
-1,435 
(0,152) 
OWNWOMBD 2,760 2,047 0,713 
1,143 
(0,253) 
DPY1 is equal to 1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise; PERWDBD is the percentage of female 
directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD 
is the percentage of institutional directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; 
OWNWOMBD is the percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD. Significant at *** for 99 percent 
confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
TABLE 4 













PERWDBD 0,080 0,075 0,005 
0,915 
(0,360) 
PERIWDBD 0,035 0,022 0,013 
0,3562*** 
(0,000) 
PERINSWDBD 0,037 0,039 -0,002 
-0,503 
(0,615) 
PEREWDBD 0,007 0,009 -0,002 
-9,975 
(0,330) 
OWNWOMBD 2,956 1,942 1,014 
1,639 
(0,102) 
DPY2 is cash dividends on common stock divided by the market value of common stock of firms; PERWDBD is 
the percentage of female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of independent female directors on 
the BD; PERINSWDBD is the percentage of institutional directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive 
directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD. Significant 




















PERWDBD 0,077 0,079 -0,002 
-0,290 
(0,772) 
PERIWDBD 0,036 0,021 0,015 
4,014***  
(0,000) 
PERINSWDBD 0,033 0,044 -0,011 
-2,379** 
(0,018) 
PEREWDBD 0,006 0,009 -0,003 
-1,385 
(0,166) 
OWNWOMBD 2,668 2,230 0,438 
0,709 
(0,479) 
DPY3 is the logarithm of the total amount of dividends paid per share in the accounting year; PERWDBD is the 
percentage of female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of independent female directors on the 
BD; PERINSWDBD is the percentage of institutional directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive 
directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD. Significant 






  DPY1 DPY2 DPY3 PERWDBD PERIWDBD PERINSWDBD PEREWDBD OWNWOMBD OWNCON IO OWNMANG LEV ROA ROE FIRMSIZE 
DPY2 0,794***               
DPY3 0,782*** 0,709***              
PERWDBD -0,001 0,034 0,021             
PERIWDBD 0,091*** 0,140*** 0,173*** 0,442***            
PERINSWDBD -0,002 -0,01 -0,031 0,563*** -0,060*           
PEREWDBD -0,033 -0,036 -0,093*** 0,286*** -0,117*** 0,058*          
OWNWOMBD 0,062* 0,061* 0,032 0,644*** 0,113*** 0,525*** 0,289***         
OWNCON -0,064* -0,036 -0,023 0,069** -0,095*** 0,104*** 0,170*** -0,019        




-0,269*** 0,170*** -0,209*** 0,248*** 0,211*** 0,307*** 0,270*** -0,005      
LEV -0,103*** -0,041 -0,002 -0,008 -0,087*** 0,075** 0,003 0,052 0,165*** -0,015 0,157***     
ROA 0,568*** 0,566*** 0,523*** -0,052 0,109*** -0,066** -0,041 -0,002 -0,067** 0,261*** -0,167*** -0,236***    
ROE 0,551*** 0,566*** 0,531*** -0,025 0,089*** -0,027 0,003 0,042 0,005 0,235*** -0,084** 0,059* 0,759***   
FIRMSIZE 0,329*** 0,403*** 0,528*** 0,033 0,186*** 0,013 -0,081** -0,037 0,109*** 0,151*** -0,258*** 0,296*** 0,092*** 0,229***  













  Model 2 
DPY2 
  Model 3 
DPY3 
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 0,066*  
  (0,074)  
































   
Firm Fix Effects Included   Included   Included   
Test Statistic   313’625***   2,296***   19,354***   
Pseudo R2   39’10%   2,91%   29,80%   
Estimated coefficients. In Model 1, the dependent variable is DPY1, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
pays dividends and 0, otherwise; in Model 2, the dependent variable is DPY2, which is calculated as the ratio between cash 
dividends on common stock ant the market value of common stock of firms; in Model 3, the dependent variable is DPY3, 
which is the logarithm of the total amount of dividend paid per share in the accounting year; PERWDBD is the percentage of 
female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the 
percentage of institutional directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD; OWNCON is the percentage of shares held by shareholders holding 
at least 10% of the firm’s stock; IO is the rate of assets growth; OWNMANG is the percentage of stocks owned by directors; 
LEV is the ratio of book value of debt over total book assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) 
over total book assets; ROE is the net income divided by stockholder’s equity; FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; BDSIZE is calculated as the total number of directors on the board. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, 
** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
